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THE INTERSECTION OF SAME-SEX AND 
STEPPARENT VISITATION 
 
Amanda Barfield* 
 
Even after victories in the same-sex marriage movement, same-
sex parents continue to have fewer rights than opposite-sex par-
ents. In New York, three statutes grant child visitation rights: a 
parent visitation statute, a grandparent visitation statute, and a 
sibling visitation statute. In Alison D. v. Virginia M., the New York 
Court of Appeals limited the statutory definition of “parent,” as 
used in the parent visitation statute, to biological parents. Alt-
hough there are certain circumstances where a non-biological 
parent may receive visitation with his or her child, a more com-
prehensive solution is needed.   
 This note argues that New York should adopt a de facto 
parenting statute—modeled after the sibling and grandparent 
statutes—that would grant standing to individuals who have acted 
in the role of parent and demonstrated extraordinary 
circumstances. Granting standing would allow same-sex partners 
to petition in court and argue that it is in the best interest of the 
child to receive visitation. This solution would allow courts to look 
at the love, care, and relationship between a non-biological parent 
and child, rather than rigid legal definitions.  
 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A., New York University, 
2012.  I would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for 
helping me through the publication process.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In June of 2011, thousands of same-sex couples celebrated the 
legalization of gay marriage in New York.1 For many, this moment 
marked a huge victory. One individual told reporters, “[i]t means 
that all of my friends can finally do the thing that they wanted to 
do . . . . It means we’re that equal.”2 Governor Cuomo remarked 
that New York “made a powerful statement.”3 He continued, 
“[t]his state is at its finest when it is a beacon of social justice.”4 
Unfortunately, marriage alone does not provide all lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) partners with the same rights5 as 
biological and/or traditional adoptive parents.6  
                                                            
1 See New York 6th State to Legalize gay marriage, CBS NEWS (June 25, 
2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-york-6th-state-to-
legalize-gay-marriage/. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Namely, a parent’s right to visit with his or her child under N.Y DOM. 
REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2014). See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 
29 (N.Y. 1991).  
6 A traditional “nuclear family” is a husband, wife, and their biological 
children. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has 
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879 n.1 (1984). Recently, the number of families 
who fall outside of the nuclear family paradigm have increased.  See Kristy M. 
Krivickas & Daphne Lofquist, Demographics of Same-Sex Couples Households 
with Children 4 (U.S. Census Bureau, Fertility & Family Statistics Branch, 
SEHSD Working Paper No. 2011-11, 2011) available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/Krivickas-Lofquist%20PAA%202 
011.pdf. In 2011, the Fertility & Family Statistics Branch of the U.S. Census 
Bureau conducted a study regarding same-sex couples with children. Id. at 1. 
The study “describe[d] the distribution of type of children (biological, step, 
adopted, non-related, or a combination of types of children) across four 
household forms: married opposite-sex; unmarried opposite-sex; same-sex 
unmarried; and same-sex with a spouse.” Id. According to the study, 33,010 
male-male unmarried couples and 71,939 female-female unmarried couples 
households contain children. Id. at 18 tbl.1. Of the male-male couples in the 
study 17.4% have step or adopted children, and of the unmarried female-female 
couples, 23% reported having step or adopted children. Id. Additionally, of the 
married same-sex couples that reported having children, 11% had children that 
were either adopted or step-children. Id.  
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Despite its recognition of same-sex marriage, New York has 
failed to recognize the legal legitimacy of same-sex separation, 
and, therefore, has effectively crippled the ability of non-biological 
parents to maintain relationships with their children after actually 
separating.7 This Note argues that courts should take a functional 
approach in determining visitation rights, which looks at the 
relationship between the child and individual seeking visitation. 
This would be achieved through a de facto parenting statute. A de 
facto parent is someone that has acted as a parent, but does not 
have the legal title through either biology or adoption. Such 
recognition would make it easier for same-sex partners to obtain 
visitation.   
The law currently fails to adequately address what happens 
when LGBT families split apart. Approximately fifty percent of 
marriages in the United States end in divorce;8 if these statistics 
persist for same-sex marriages as well, then same-sex couples will 
increasingly face dissolution in Family Court. The process of 
dissolution becomes even more difficult when children are 
involved. The prevalence of LGBT parents makes the situation 
even more dire: in New York, sixteen percent of same-sex couples 
report that they are raising their own children.9 Further, New York 
has taken several steps to foster the development of LGBT 
families, including the legalization of gay marriage, adoption by 
same-sex couples, and donor insemination.10  It is therefore 
essential that the legislature and the courts take steps to remedy the 
issues associated with the dissolution of same-sex couples.  
Despite New York’s increasing support of LGBT families, the 
New York legislature and Court of Appeals have erected strict 
standing requirements in visitation cases that adversely affect 
same-sex parents. The statutory framework limits standing for 
                                                            
7 See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29–30 (holding that the term “parent” is 
limited to biological parents in visitation disputes). 
8 See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Marriage and Divorce, CDC 
HOME, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm (last updated June 
19, 2014). 
9 “Snapshot: LGBT Equality By State”, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, 
http://www.familyequality.org/get_informed/equality_maps/snapshot_lgbt_equa
lity_by_state/ (select New York from menu) (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
10 Id. 
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visitation cases to a narrow group of individuals: parents,11 
grandparents,12 and siblings.13 In addition to legislative barriers to 
visitation, the New York Court of Appeals has also interpreted the 
statute to deny same-sex, non-biological parents access to their 
children. The Court’s current approach to visitation starts with 
Alison D. v. Virginia M., which held that a long-term same-sex 
partner, who was not the biological parent of her child, was not a 
“parent” within the meaning of New York Domestic Relations 
Law § 70 and was therefore ineligible to obtain visitation with her 
child.14  
Alison D. had devastating consequences for non-biological 
same-sex parents. To soften these consequences,15 some lower 
courts have used the doctrine of equitable estoppel.16 In Jean Maby 
H. v. Joseph H., the Appellate Division for the Second Department 
ruled that “a non-biological parent may invoke the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel to preclude the biological parent from cutting 
off custody visitation with the child.”17 The court took note that the 
former husband had been significantly involved in raising the child 
and had become a part of the child’s life.18 Due to the former 
husband’s notable involvement with the child, the court reasoned 
that it would have been inequitable for the mother to assert her 
exclusive custodial right as the biological parent and deny him 
visitation.19 
                                                            
11 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2014) (authorizing parents to 
petition for visitation with a child). 
12 Id. § 72 (granting standing for visitation to grandparents upon a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances). 
13 Id. § 71 (granting standing for visitation to siblings upon a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances). 
14 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29–30. 
15 See, e.g., Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 246 N.Y.S.2d 677, 677 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998). 
16 The doctrine of equitable estoppel allows a court to prevent the 
application of a law that would lead to injustice. Id. In this context, equitable 
estoppel prevents a custodial parent from using the parent visitation statute—as 
interpreted by Alison D.—as means to deny visitation, if the denial of visitation 
would be unjust. See id.   
17 Id. at 678. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 682. The granting of equitable estoppel does not automatically 
 SAME-SEX VISITATION 261 
Approximately twenty years later, the Court reversed lower 
courts’ efforts to erode its inequitable consequences and affirmed 
the principle of Alison D. In Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York 
Court of Appeals held that courts could no longer use the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel to allow a former partner to seek visitation 
with a non-biological child.20 Despite reaffirming the holding of 
Alison D., the New York Court of Appeals employed the doctrine 
of comity to recognize the former partner’s parentage from another 
state—the couple at issue had a civil union in Vermont, and 
therefore, “New York [would] recognize parentage created by a 
civil union . . . .”21 The Debra H. decision began a judicial pattern 
to carve out exceptions to Alison D., while maintaining the basic 
principle limiting the rights of non-biological parent-partners.22 
The decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in Alison D. and 
Debra H. were met with substantial criticism from both legal 
scholars23 and the lower courts.24  
                                                            
grant visitation rights; it grants the party standing to then be able to argue it is in 
the “best interest of the child” to visit with that person. Id. at 286.  
20 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 190 (2010). This ruling must 
only apply to non-biological children who have not been adopted, as adoption 
grants a person the same legal rights as biological parents, and therefore, an 
adoptive parent has automatic standing to seek visitation with the subject child.  
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 2014).  
21 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190.  
22 See id.  
23 For examples of strong scholarly criticism, see Suzanna Goldberg, 
Harriet Antczak & Mark Musico, Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court: 
Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 348 (2011) (arguing for a functional approach to family law in the 
context of same-sex couples that recognizes the rights of non-biological 
parents); Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner 
Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 623 (2012) (critiquing the courts rationale of predictability in 
limiting the term “parent” to biological parents); Joanna L. Grossman, The New 
Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 671 (2012); Jason C. Beekman, Same-Sex 
Marriage: Strengthening the Shield or Sharpening the Sword? The Impact of 
Legalizing Marriage on Child Custody/Visitation and Child Support for Same-
Sex Couples, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215 (Spring 2012).   
24 See Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) 
(“In the seventeen years since Alison D., under constraint of that decision, courts 
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In addition to the inequalities created by Alison D., the 
reluctance of the Court of Appeals to abandon Alison D. has led to 
a perverse outcome that links visitation to child support.25 In 
Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., the Family Court held that a mother 
could not prevent her former partner from seeking visitation with 
the child on the basis that the partner did not qualify as a parent.26 
The court reasoned that because the biological mother sought child 
support from her former partner, and claimed that the partner was a 
“parent” for child support purposes, the mother could not 
concurrently claim that she was not a “parent” for visitation 
purposes.27 Therefore, the court tied the partner’s right to visitation 
to the biological parent’s need for child support.   
The legalization of same-sex marriage provided a limited 
benefit because it only conferred stepparent status, and a stepparent 
is not entitled to visitation. In 2011, the New York legislature 
legalized same-sex marriage.28 As a result, a same-sex partner who 
is married to the child’s biological parent receives the status of 
“stepparent.”  While this may benefit some same-sex partners,29 
                                                            
have continued to deny the proactive efforts of non-biological, non-adoptive 
domestic partner or spouse to obtain custodial rights, notwithstanding the ties 
that may have developed between that person and the child.”). 
25 See Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845–47 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 2013) (holding respondent “judicially estopped from asserting that petitioner 
is not a parent based upon her sworn petition and testimony in a prior court 
proceeding where she took a different position because her interest in that case 
was different. . . . This biological parent deliberately sought to involve her 
former partner in her child’s life at least until her financial majority.”). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2014). 
29 See Counihan v. Bishop, 111 N.Y.S.2d 137, 137–38 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013) (recognizing that after the passage of the Marriage Equality Act, same sex 
partners of children conceived through artificial insemination become the legal 
parents under N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1)). Section 73 of the Domestic 
Relations Law reads that “[a]ny child born to a married woman by means of 
artificial insemination performed by persons duly authorized to practice 
medicine and with the consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall 
be deemed the legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all 
purposes.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73. This statute uses marriage to determine 
the legal relationship with the child—not biology—and, therefore, same-sex 
marriage provides greater rights in this context. See id; see also Counihan v. 
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laws regarding visitation are not favorable to the stepparent.30 In 
New York, “step-parents have no independent rights in relation to 
their step-children, they . . . derive certain legal and de facto rights 
and obligations as the spouse of a parent.”31 Moreover, stepparents 
are generally not obligated to pay child support in New York;32 
therefore, the mechanism that allowed same-sex partners to 
continue to visit with non-biological children following a 
separation (paying child support) is not even readily available to 
same-sex stepparents. Further complicating non-biological parents’ 
efforts, electing to pay child support would not resolve the issue. It 
is not the act of supporting a child that allows a person to seek 
visitation, but that the biological parent, in the petition for child 
support, nominally claims that the partner is a “parent.”33 
Therefore, marriage alone, does not provide a sufficient remedy to 
non-biological parents seeking visitation with a non-adopted child. 
A de facto parenting statute would resolve the problem created 
by Alison D. and Janice R.  A de facto parent is “one who has no 
biological relation to the child, but has participated in the child’s 
life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides 
with the child and . . . performs a share of caretaking functions at 
least as great as the legal parent.”34 New York should adopt a de 
                                                            
Bishop, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 139 (reaching the same conclusion). 
30 See Bank v. White, 837 N.Y.S. 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that 
a husband did not have standing to seek visitation with his stepchildren). 
31 Spenser v. Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. Fam. Crt. 1983) 
(italics in original).  
32 See Kaiser v. Kaiser, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (“A 
stepparent does not merely by reason of the affinity stand in loco parentis to a 
stepchild. The legal liability of support of a stepparent for a stepchild arises by 
statute when the child is receiving or is in danger of receiving public 
assistance.”). For the statute discussed in Kaiser, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 
(McKinney 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the spouse or parent 
of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need 
therefore or of a patient in an institution in the department of mental hygiene, if 
of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person or patient, 
provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of his child or 
children who have not attained the age of twenty-one years”). 
33 Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d  at 847.  
34 William C. Duncan, The Legal Fiction of De Facto Parenting, 36 J. 
LEGIS. 263, 265 (2010) (quoting E.N.O v. L.M.M, 429 Mass. 824, 829 (1999)).  
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facto parenting statute—a statute modeled after the grandparent 
and sibling visitation statutes—which would grant standing to a de 
facto parent. Then, having achieved the first hurdle of standing, a 
de facto parent would be able to argue that it is in the best interest 
of the child to visit with her. 
Part I of this Note analyzes case law relevant to the issue of 
same-sex visitation. Part II shows the increased reliance on child-
support in visitation cases involving same-sex couples and the 
problems associated with this linkage. Part III discusses the 
intersection between stepparent visitation and same-sex 
partnerships, and the effect on same-sex stepparents of the growing 
reliance on child support as a means to visitation. Part IV outlines 
proposed solutions to the problem confronting same-sex 
stepparents seeking visitation and shows why those solutions are 
inadequate. Part V argues for a de facto parenting statute as a 
solution to the barriers confronting same-sex stepparents who seek 
visitation rights, and provides examples of states that permit de 
facto parenting. Finally, Part VI addresses the criticisms of de facto 
parenting as a solution, and why those criticisms are without merit. 
 
I.      THE CASE LAW OF NON-BIOLOGICAL AND SAME-SEX 
PARENT VISITATION 
 
This Part analyzes two New York cases that have shaped the 
legal landscape of same-sex visitation: Alison D. v. Virginia M.35 
and Debra H. v. Janice R.36 Together, these cases have prevented 
non-biological parents from obtaining visitation with their 
children.   
 
A.  Alison D. v. Virginia M.  
 
Alison D. and Virginia M. began their relationship in 1977, and 
shortly thereafter, they moved in together in Putnam County, New 
York.37 When the couple decided to have children, they elected 
                                                            
35 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). 
36 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
37 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law Reform Litigation: 
Unrecognized Parents and the Story of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 17 COLUM. J. 
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that Virginia would be the biological parent via artificial 
insemination.38 Virginia gave birth to their son, Andrew, in July 
1981.39 Andrew took the surnames of both of his parents, and the 
women shared child-rearing responsibilities, “from doctor visits 
and discipline to the ins and out[s] of nursery school.”40 As for 
Andrew’s own perceptions of his family make-up, even though 
Alison was not his biological mother, “Andrew’s grandparents 
included Alison’s parents (‘Grammy’ and ‘Grandad’) and Alison’s 
grandfather (‘Poppa’).”41   
Two years later, Alison and Virginia ended their relationship.42 
Initially, the two worked out a schedule where “Andrew would 
stay overnight with Alison two or three nights per week and would 
also spend some birthdays, holidays, and vacation time with her.”43 
Additionally, Virginia permitted Alison to go on vacations with 
Andrew and attend family events with Alison.44 Over time, 
however, Virginia began limiting Alison’s access to Andrew, 
against his express wishes.45 When Alison took a job in Ireland, 
Virginia obstructed contact between Alison and the child by 
returning things that Alison sent to him.46 
Alison attempted to resolve the conflict privately,47 but when 
those efforts failed, she filed a petition in New York Supreme 
Court in 1988.48 The Supreme Court relied on Ronald FF. v. Cindy 
GG.49 and dismissed the petition.50 In Ronald FF., the court denied 
visitation to a mother’s former boyfriend on the grounds that he 
                                                            
GENDER & L. 307, 311 (2008).  
38 See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. 
39 Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 37, at 312.  
40 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 311.  
41 Id.  
42 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. 
43 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 314.  
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. 
47 Alison wrote letters to Virginia.  Goldberg, supra note 37, at 316.  
48 Id. at 321.  
49 In re Ronald FF., 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987). 
50 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30–31. 
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was not a biological parent.51 The Supreme Court continued the 
narrow definition of parent.52 
On appeal, the Appellate Division for the Second Department 
affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.53 The Second Department 
recognized the significant role Alison played in Andrew’s life, 
stating: 
We do not . . . minimize, in any way, the close and 
loving relationship that the petitioner has apparently 
developed with the child. Indeed, had the petitioner 
come within the meaning of the term “parent” 
contained in Domestic Relations Law §70, her 
claim for visitation would have been worthy of 
serious consideration.54 
On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that 
Alison was not a “parent” within the meaning of the law because 
she was not a biological parent.55 This formalistic definition of 
“parent” was not unanimously adopted by the court.56 In her 
dissent, Judge Kaye said, “[t]he Court’s decision, fixing biology as 
the key to visitation rights, has impact far beyond this particular 
controversy, one that may affect a wide spectrum of 
relationships—including those of longtime heterosexual 
stepparents, ‘common-law’ and non-heterosexual partners such as 
involved here.”57 Judge Kaye recognized that such an impact 
would not be in the best interest of children,58 and therefore, 
                                                            
51 In re Ronald FF., 511 N.E.2d at 77. 
52 See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (defining parent within the meaning of 
section 70 as the child’s biological parent or legal guardian by virtue of 
adoption). 
53 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990). 
54 Id.  
55 See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30. 
56 Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (“But the impact of today’s decision falls hardest on the children of 
those relationships, limiting their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be 
crucial to their development. The majority’s retreat from the courts’ proper 
role—its tightening of rules that should in visitation petitions, above all, retain 
the capacity to take the children’s interests into account—compels this 
dissent.”). 
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argued that the case should be remanded to determine whether 
Alison D. stood in loco parentis.59 Other courts and legal scholars 
generally agreed with Judge Kaye’s dissent and criticized this 
landmark decision.60 
 
B.  Debra H. v. Janice R.  
 
Twenty years later, the Court of Appeals declined to overrule 
Alison D.61 Janice R. was the biological parent of M.R., who was 
conceived through artificial insemination prior to a civil union.62 
Janice R. and Debra H. met in 2003 and “entered into a civil union 
in the State of Vermont in November 2013, the month before 
M.R.’s birth.”63   
When the couple split, Janice R. initially allowed Debra H. to 
maintain a relationship with the child; however, in 2008, Janice R. 
started restricting visits.64 Debra H. filed for visitation in New 
York State Supreme Court seeking “joint legal custody of M.R., 
restoration of access and decision-making authority with respect to 
his upbringing, and appointment of an attorney for the child.”65 
The State Supreme Court did not award joint legal custody, but did 
allow for visitation.66 The court reasoned that “it was inconsistent 
to estop a nonbiological father from disclaiming paternity in order 
to avoid support obligation, but preclude a nonbiological parent 
from invoking equitable estoppel against the biological parent in 
                                                            
59 Id. at 31. “In loco parentis refers to a person who has fully put himself 
in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming all the obligations incident to the 
parental relationship and who actually discharges those obligations.” Rutkowski 
v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955). 
60 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 20 A.D.3d 333, 333–34 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (Ellerin and Sweeny, JJ., concurring); Schepard, Revisiting 
‘Alison D.’: Child Visitation Rights for Domestic Partners, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 
2002, at 3; Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian 
Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 516–517, 522–532 
(1993). 
61 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010).  
62 Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 2010).. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 185–86. 
65 Id. at 186.  
66 Id. 
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order to maintain an established relationship with the child . . . .”67 
The court permitted visitation for Debra H. on the grounds of 
equitable estoppel.68 On appeal, the Appellate Division for the 
First Department overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling.69 The 
Appellate Division applied Alison D. and determined that the 
plaintiff did not have standing to seek visitation.70  
The New York Court of Appeals continued its formalistic 
approach to family law.71 The court distinguished between 
paternity cases and visitation cases; it held that although equitable 
estoppel may be used to prevent a person from denying paternity, 
equitable estoppel may not be used in visitation cases.72 The court 
reaffirmed Alison D. despite its inequitable results.73  However, the 
majority managed to still rule in Debra H.’s favor74 based on the 
doctrine of comity.75 
Judge Graffeo and Judge Ciparick each wrote concurring 
opinions that agreed with the outcome of the case, but opposed the 
current meaning of Alison D.76 Judge Graffeo was strongly in favor 
of retaining Alison D.’s holding; he praised both the decision’s 
clarity and its ability to reduce litigation.77 In contrast, Judge 
Ciparick advocated for overruling Alison D.: 
In countless cases across the state, the lower-courts, 
                                                            
67 Id. (discussing In re Shondel, 853 N.E.2d 610 (2006) (applying the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel to a paternity case to prevent an individual who 
acted as a father from denying paternity)).  
68 Id. at 187.  
69 See Debra H. v. Janice R, 877 N.Y.S.2d 259, 259–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009). 
70 Id. 
71 Compare Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 33 (N.Y. 1991) 
(maintaining a formal definition of “parent”), with Debra H., 14 N.E.2d at 192 
(distinguishing between visitation and paternity for the application of equitable 
estoppel).  
72 Debra H., 14 N.E.2d at 199.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 The doctrine of comity allows a state court to apply the law of a 
different state; in this case, the parties married and had their child in Vermont, 
therefore, the court applied Vermont law. See Id. at 192.  
76 Id. at 195 (Ciparick, J., concurring); Id. at 193 (Graffeo, J., concurring).  
77 Id. at 193–95 (Graffeo, J., concurring).  
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constrained by the harsh rule of Alison D., have 
been forced to . . . permanently sever strongly 
formed bonds between children and adults with 
whom they have parental relationships . . . . 
Moreover, the decision in Alison D. has been both 
questioned by judges . . . and roundly criticized by 
legal scholars.78 
Judge Ciparick’s opinion reiterates the concerns that Judge Kaye 
voiced in her dissent to Alison D. twenty years prior.79 Judge 
Ciparick agreed with the outcome of the decision, that Debra H. is 
entitled to visitation, but believed that the court should have 
overruled Alison D. and considered Debra H. a parent.80 
The passage of the Marriage Equality Act partially resolved the 
problem that Alison D. and Debra H. created in the context of 
artificial insemination.81 The New York statute on artificial 
insemination states that “[a]ny child born to a married woman by 
means of artificial insemination performed by persons duly 
authorized to practice medicine and with the consent of the woman 
and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate birth child of the 
husband and his wife for all purposes.”82 This statute uses marriage 
to determine the legal relationship with the child—not biology—
and, therefore, same-sex marriage provides greater rights in this 
context.83  
However, Alison D. and Debra H. continue to be a significant 
barrier to visitation for same-sex partners. As Judge Kaye stated, 
the implications of limiting the definition of a “parent” to his/her 
biological relationship with a child reach far beyond the narrow 
facts of Alison D.  With Alison D.’s holding firmly in place, there 
are few options for non-biological, separated parents to maintain 
                                                            
78 Id. at 196.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See Counihan v. Bishop, 974 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) 
(recognizing that after the passage of the Marriage Equality Act, same-sex 
partners of children conceived through artificial insemination become the legal 
parents under N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1)).   
82 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2014). 
83 See Counihan, 974 N.Y.S.2d at 138.   
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relationships with their children. Unlike in other states,84 in New 
York, marriage alone generally does not enable a person to seek 
visitation.85 New York instead reduces parenthood to biology. 
Therefore, a solution is needed that mitigates the harsh effects of 
Alison D. and Debra H. for same-sex stepparents. 
 
II.      THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT IN 
SAME-SEX VISITATION CASES  
 
An exception to the Alison D. rule manifests if the biological 
parent seeks child support from the non-biological parent.86 
However, this approach has undesirable consequences.87 In New 
York, the interdependence between child support and visitation has 
changed over time. Traditionally, New York courts maintained a 
strong interdependence between child support and visitation.88 
However, more recently courts have made efforts to separate the 
notions of child support and visitation.89 Despite these efforts, 
child support and visitation remain deeply intertwined.90 This 
                                                            
84 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 189–90 (discussing and applying Vermont 
law).  
85 See, e.g., Bank v. White, 837 N.Y.S. 181 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(holding that a husband did not have standing to seek visitation with his 
stepchildren). Due to the relatively recent ability for same-sex couples to marry, 
there have not been any cases yet regarding their visitation disputes.   
86 See Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013). 
87 For example, this framework creates multiple definitions of the term 
“parent.” See Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–28.  
88 See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the 
Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 625 (1989). 
89 See, e.g., Stewart v. Soda, 642 N.Y.S.2d 105, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (“Family Court erred in terminating visitation between respondent and his 
children because respondent failed to pay child support.  Visitation cannot be 
terminated solely for reasons unrelated to the welfare of the child.”); 
Labanowski v. Labanowski, 857 N.Y.S. 737, 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (stating 
that the obligation to pay child support may be terminated only if the party 
proves that “a child of employable age . . . actively abandons the noncustodial 
parent by refusing all contact and visitation, without cause, “or the party may 
prove that the custodial parent “unjustifiably frustrated the noncustodial parent’s 
right of reasonable access . . . .”).   
90 See Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47. 
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connection is especially problematic for same-sex couples because 
it not only motivates biological parents to use visitation and child 
support as weapons,91 but it also creates an arbitrary definition of 
“parenthood” by allowing someone to be a “parent” for the 
purpose of child support, but not for that of visitation.92 
 
A.   Approaches to the Connection Between Child Support and 
Visitation 
 
Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York exemplify the three 
approaches to the connection between child support and 
visitation.93 In Pennsylvania, a visitation determination is 
completely separate from a child support determination.94 In 
Florida, courts link child support and visitation only under certain 
circumstances.95 Finally, in New York, child support used to be 
inextricably linked to visitation; however, more recently, New 
York has moved to separate the two issues.96 
 
i. Pennsylvania 
 
Pennsylvania has completely separated child support 
proceedings from visitation proceedings.97 Two cases that best 
illustrate this separation are Kramer v. Kelly and Commonwealth 
ex rel. Mickey.98 In Kramer, after the father and mother separated, 
                                                            
91 See Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 638. See infra notes 147–53 for a 
discussion of parents using visitation and support obligations as weapons.  
92  See Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–28 (comparing the cases of Debra 
H. and H.M. which were decided on the same day, but represent different views 
of the scope of parenting in the context of custody/visitation cases and child 
support cases.). 
93 See Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 621–25.  
94 Id. at 621, 623–24. 
95 Id. at 624–25.  
96 Id. at 625.  
97 Id. at 621–24. 
98 See Kramer v. Kelly, 401 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that a 
parent is obligated to pay child support even if the custodial parent actively 
keeps the child away from the non-custodial parent and refuses to disclose the 
whereabouts of the child); Commonwealth ex rel. Mickey, 280 A.2d. 417 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1971) (holding that a father’s obligation to pay child support was not 
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the father went to visit his child but found the mother’s home 
abandoned.99 He made various attempts to locate his child, 
including contacting the post office and hiring a private 
detective.100 The father had been up to date with all child-support 
payments until this incident, when he terminated support.101 When 
the father finally located the mother and child, he petitioned for 
contempt;102 in response to his petition, the mother filed for a 
violation of the child support order.103 The lower court ruled in 
favor of the mother, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 
that order to hold the father liable for the child support he withheld 
while the mother denied visitation.104  
Similarly in Commonwealth ex rel Mickey, a mother took the 
child out of the father’s home and transported the child to another 
state without notifying the father.105 In response to the mother’s 
actions, the father stopped paying child support.106 In vacating the 
lower court’s decision that suspended child support, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court found “[t]he duty to support children 
is not dependent upon custody of them. Even assuming that the 
mother improperly removed the children from the defendant’s 
home to another state, her misconduct in doing so cannot destroy 
                                                            
absolved when the mother took the child from the father’s home and brought the 
child to another state). 
99  Kramer, 401 A.2d at 800. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102 When an individual violates an order of child support, they may be 
held in contempt. Id. In civil court, the purpose of the order of contempt is to 
coerce the person to comply with the court order; whereas in criminal court, the 
purpose is to “vindicate the authority of the court.” Id. at 801. A person found in 
contempt could be placed in jail; however, with a civil contempt order, 
compliance with the original court order will release the individual. Id. In 
Kramer, the court failed to “set conditions for purging the contempt”—a 
requirement for civil contempt in Pennsylvania—and the matter was remanded 
to the lower court to determine whether the father was in contempt.  Id. (citing 
Barrett v. Barrett, 368 A.2d 616, 612 (Pa. 1977)). 
103 Id. at 800. 
104 Id. at 799–800. 
105 Commonwealth ex rel. Mickey, 280 A.2d. 417, 418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1971). 
106 Id. at 418.  
 SAME-SEX VISITATION 273 
the right of those children to support from the father.”107 Therefore, 
in Pennsylvania, even purposeful interference with the non-
custodial parent’s visitation rights would not impact the obligation 
to pay child support.108 
 
ii. Florida 
 
Florida takes a more nuanced approach to the connection 
between child support and visitation.109 In Florida, the parties can 
elect to make child support contingent upon visitation.110  For 
example, in Craig v. Craig, the parents signed a divorce decree 
with a clause that stated that the mother “shall not remove said 
children beyond the jurisdiction of this Court without special order 
of the Court.”111 When the mother violated this provision, the 
Supreme Court of Florida held that the father’s obligation to pay 
child support was suspended because the mother “deliberately, 
consistently, and maliciously” denied the father visitation.112  
However, Florida sets limits on the connection between child 
support and visitation.113 The first limitation is that “denial of 
visitation may not be raised as a defense [to a suit to recover an 
unpaid child-support obligation], unless the child support duty had 
been conditioned on visitation by court order.”114 The second 
limitation is that visitation may not be conditioned on child 
support.115 The reverse is allowed, “a non-residential parent may 
withhold support . . . if the residential parent has refused to allow 
visitation.”116 Therefore, although Florida allows for some 
                                                            
107 Id. at 419. 
108 See id. 
109 Compare Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 624 (discussing Florida’s 
approach), with id. at 621 (discussing Pennsylvania’s approach), and id. at 625 
(discussing New York’s approach). 
110 Id. at 624.  
111 Craig v. Craig, 26 So. 2d 881, 881 (Fla. 1946). 
112 Id. at 882–83. 
113 See Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 625.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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interdependence between child support and visitation, this 
interdependence is limited.  
 
iii. New York 
 
New York, historically, exemplified the third approach to child 
support and visitation, which consistently connected custody and 
visitation disputes.117 Parents would develop contracts that made 
financial support for the custodial parent and child contingent upon 
visitation with the child.118 Even after the codification of child 
support laws in New York—the first of which passed in 1962119—
the contractual approach to visitation and child support is still an 
option for individuals in New York.120 In the 1960s and 1970s, 
courts in New York adopted the dependent approach to custody 
and visitation.121 In Fleischer v. Fleischer, the Appellate Division 
affirmed the Family Court’s decision to make child support 
dependent on visitation.122 
More recently, however, New York has moved away from the 
strict connection between child support and visitation.123 This 
                                                            
117 Id. 
118 See id. 
119 See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 413 (McKinney 2014) (illustrating 
New York’s laws concerning a parent’s duty to support a child).  
120 See Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 625 (“[S]eparation contract has 
survived the creation of such child support laws. Currently, such a reciprocal 
separation contract remains enforceable even after divorce, unless the issues are 
covered by the divorce decree.”). 
121 See, e.g., Callender v. Callender, 325 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1971); Fleischer v. Fleischer, 269 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1966); Hudson v. Hudson, 412 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).  
122 Fleischer, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 271. 
123 See Labanowski v. Labanowski, 857 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (stating that the obligation to pay child support may be terminated 
only if the party proves that “a child of employable age . . . actively abandons 
the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation, without cause,” or 
proves that the custodial parent “unjustifiably frustrated the noncustodial 
parent’s right of reasonable access . . . .”); Stewart v. Soda, 642 N.Y.S.2d 105, 
106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Family Court erred in terminating visitation 
between respondent and his children because respondent failed to pay child 
support. Visitation cannot be terminated solely for reasons unrelated to the 
welfare of the child.”).  
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transition reflects a shift toward a more functional and less rigid 
approach to family law.124 Currently, the obligation to pay child 
support is not dependent on visitation, with limited exceptions.125 
The first exception is abandonment by the child.126 The party 
seeking to terminate child support has the burden of proof to 
establish abandonment.127 First, the party must show that the child 
is of “employable age.”128 Second, the party must show that the 
child “actively abandon[ed] the noncustodial parent by refusing all 
contact and visitation, without cause.”129 
The second exception to the general rule imposing child 
support, regardless of visitation status, is “parental alienation.”130 
Parental alienation occurs when the custodial parent has taken 
affirmative steps that “severely frustrated visitation by either 
relocating to a distant location without permission or by 
intentionally alienating and brainwashing the child against the non-
custodial parent.”131 
Despite these advances, New York courts’ progression away 
from the rigid contingency between child support and visitation 
                                                            
124 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function 
and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 419, 476. (Winter 2013) (“Such disaggregation of parental 
rights makes sense particularly for functional parents because their rights and 
obligations are based on the actual specific functions that they perform, which 
do not necessarily include all parental responsibilities and entitlements. While 
rights and obligations may also be disaggregated for formal parents, formal 
status creates a context in which assigning the whole basket of parental rights is 
more appropriate.”). “[F]unctional parenthood is defined as the assignment of 
parental status based on actual, ‘functional’ care work or support for the 
children.” Id. at 428. This is in contrast to a “formal approach to parenthood . . . 
that is determined ex ante, usually established at birth, and most importantly, 
determined by a legal rule that is applied without judicial discretion.” Id. at 435. 
125 See Stewart, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 105.   
126 Labanowski, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (quoting In re Chamberlin, 658 
N.Y.S.2d 751 (1997)). 
127 Id. (quoting In re Wiegert, 699 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1999)). 
128 Id. (citing In re Chamberlin, 658 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1997)). 
129 Id. 
130 See, e.g., F.S.–P. v. A.H.R., 844 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2007). 
131 Id. (quoting In re Celeste S., 579 N.Y.S.2d 94, 94 (1992)).  
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has not occurred for same-sex partners.132 While New York courts 
have adopted a functional approach to determine the role a 
noncustodial biological parent may play in a child’s life, New 
York courts maintain a formal definition of parent, which 
necessitates formality in the obligations of same-sex partners.133 
Whereas for opposite-sex parents, the general rule is that visitation 
is not dependent on child support, the same is not true for same-sex 
parents.134 For same-sex parents, a court order for visitation is 
dependent on the fulfillment of child support.135 The reliance on 
child support in same-sex partner cases is the result of Alison D. 
and Debra H. remaining good law.136 These cases, however, do not 
mean that family courts never award visitation to same-sex parents, 
but only that a court’s decision to award visitation to a non-
custodial same-sex parent hinges upon that parent’s payment of 
child support.137   
Courts have eroded the adjudicative division between visitation 
and child support in the context of same-sex couples. In 2007, 
Estrellita A. and  Jennifer D. became “domestic partners,” and in 
the following year, Jennifer D. received artificial insemination and 
became pregnant with a child, Hannah.138 The parties separated in 
2012 without Estrellita A. having filed for adoption of Hannah.139 
In a petition for child support, Jennifer D. stated that she and 
Estrellita had a child in common.140 When Estrellita A. filed for 
                                                            
132 See Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013). 
133 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E. 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); see 
generally Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 124 (explaining the complex considerations 
in determining parental rights). 
134 See Stewart v. Soda, 642 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); 
Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d at 846. 
135 See Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d at 847. 
136 See id. (reaffirming the principle and validity of Alison D. despite the 
court reaching a different outcome).  
137 See id. 
138 Id. at 844. 
139 Id. If Estrellita adopted the child, this visitation dispute would have 
been resolved. Adoption confers all of the same legal rights as a biological 
relationship. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 2014); In re 
Adoption of Jennifer, 538 N.Y.S.2d 915, 915 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989). 
140 Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d at 844. 
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visitation, on the other hand, Jennifer D. argued that Estrellita A. 
was not a “parent” under the law according to Alison D. and she, 
therefore, lacked standing for visitation purposes.141 
Rather than determining standing using the “extraordinary 
circumstances” doctrine—a functional approach that examines an 
adult’s role in a child’s life142—the court utilized the “doctrine 
against inconsistent positions.”143 The doctrine against inconsistent 
positions states that a party may not make conflicting claims.144 In 
the context of Estrellita A., the doctrine meant that: 
[Jennifer D. was] judicially estopped from asserting 
that [Estrellita A. was] not a parent based upon her 
sworn petition and testimony in a prior court 
proceeding . . . . This biological parent deliberately 
sought to involve her former partner in her child’s 
life at least until her financial majority.145 
The grave implication of this ruling is: had Jennifer D. never 
sought child support from Estrellita A., Estrellita A. would have 
been denied access to Hannah despite having raised Hannah as her 
own for the entirety of the child’s life.146 
 
iv.  Critiques of the Connection Between Child Support and 
Visitation 
 
Various scholars and courts have recognized the problems that 
arise from making visitation dependent on child support.147 These 
                                                            
141 Id. at 846.  
142 See, e.g., In re E.S., 863 N.E.2d 100, 104 (N.Y. 2007) (demonstrating 
that “extraordinary circumstances” had been met in this case where the 
grandmother had “an extraordinarily close relationship [with the child] during 
the nearly five-year period that she lived with him” and the child “articulated a 
deep love for and attachment to grandmother”); In re Cocose, No. V-4205-04, 
2005 WL 1792599, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. July 22, 2005) (arguing that a sibling 
lacked standing to seek visitation because “since Michael has not lived with 
Sandra since their removal from their birth parents’ home in 1997, their contact 
is minimal and insufficient . . . .”). 
143 Estrellita A., 963 N.Y.S.2d at 847. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 845–46. 
146 See id. 
147 See Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 638. 
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problems often harm the child. For example, under the traditional 
New York regime, which strongly attaches the right of visitation to 
the obligation to pay child support, there is an incentive for the 
noncustodial parent to use child support as a weapon against the 
custodial parent.148 A noncustodial parent may therefore withhold 
child support when arguments arise about the visitation schedule, 
or about any other facet of visitation.149 This withholding against 
the other parent has a detrimental impact upon the child.150 
Furthermore, like the parents, “[t]he child is a joint holder of the 
support and visitation rights with the respective parents.”151 When 
one parent acts out against the other by withholding child support 
or visitation, the child also suffers.152 This outcome contravenes 
the central goal of family law—to serve “the child’s best 
interest.”153 
In addition to general critiques of this contingency, a central 
legal critique of the connection between child support and 
visitation for same-sex partners is that it creates differing 
definitions of “parent” in the two areas of law.154 In H.M. v. E.T., 
the Court of Appeals held that a partner, who was not biologically 
related to the child, was obligated to pay child support to the 
biological mother.155 The Court took a liberal approach in 
                                                            
148 See id. at 638–39. 
149 See id. 
150 See Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Making Parents Behave: The Conditioning 
of Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1068–69 
(1984).    
151 Id. at 1069.  
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 1069–70 (discussing that some judges have altered 
agreements that have visitation and child support dependent on one another 
because the outcome violates the best interest standard, and concluding that 
“[t]he contractual doctrine of constructive conditions of exchange, therefore, 
cannot be relied on to justify the linkage of child support and visitation because 
of its failure to account for the child’s best interest . . . .”). 
154 Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–34 (comparing the cases of Debra H. 
and H.M. which were decided on the same day, and discussing how they 
represent different views of the scope of parenting in the context of 
custody/visitation cases and child support cases.). 
155 H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y. 2010).  
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determining parenthood for child support in furtherance of the 
“public policy of the State in favor of obligating individuals, 
regardless of gender, to provide support for their children.”156 
However, on the same day, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Alison 
D.’s definition of a “parent” for visitation—a much narrower 
definition.157 This inconsistency in determining who is a “parent” 
prioritizes an adult’s financial contributions to a child over that 
person’s love, support, and caretaking of a child. Some family law 
practitioners have argued that the connection between visitation 
and child support fosters greater rights for non-biological same-sex 
parents than they previously had;158 however, the differing 
definitions of parent is a fundamental harm that outweighs any 
incremental benefit to a same-sex partner’s rights.  
Although Estrellita A. provides relief for a small group of 
same-sex parents, there are negative consequences from the 
interdependence between child support and visitation. Estrellita A. 
creates a different relationship between child support and visitation 
for biological and non-biological parents. Additionally, it creates a 
different definition of “parent” for child support and visitation. 
Estrellita A. and its problems are the result of Alison D.  If Alison 
D. had not held that only biological parents were “parents” for 
visitation purposes, courts would not need to determine whether a 
person can achieve standing because of a prior order of child 
support. This further demonstrates that a solution to Alison D. is 
needed.   
 
 
                                                            
156 Id.; see also Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–28. 
157 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 2010); 
Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–28. 
158 See, e.g., Elliot S. Schlissel, Biological Mother Can’t Argue Ex-Same 
Sex Partner Not Be Considered a Child’s Parent, SCHLISSEL LAW FIRM  (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.schlissellawfirm.com/blog/2013/biological-mother-cant-
argue-ex-same-sex-partner-not-be-considered-a-childs-parent/ (stating that the 
opinion of Judge Theresa Whelan, which stated that a biological parent could 
not claim a former partner was not the “parent” because of a previous child 
support case, was “an example of a Family Court Judge protecting the visitation 
rights of the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship.”). 
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III.      STEPPARENTS, VISITATION, AND THE OBLIGATION TO PAY 
CHILD SUPPORT  
 
The courts’ linkage of child support to visitation for same-sex 
parents puts same-sex stepparents at a significant disadvantage. 
Three factors contribute to this disadvantage for same-sex 
stepparents: first, stepparents do not have standing to seek 
visitation with their children;159 second, stepparents generally do 
not have any obligation to pay child support except in limited 
circumstances;160 and third, the obligation to pay child support 
automatically ends when the stepparent and biological parent 
divorce.161 Under Estrellita A., an individual could obtain standing 
to seek visitation due to child support; however, an individual only 
obtains standing to seek visitation under Estrellita A. if the 
biological parent files a petition for child support and claims that 
the individual is a parent.162 Electing to pay child support would 
not provide any relief. Therefore, a stepparent is unable to seek 
visitation with a child.   
The limited definition of “parent” established in Alison D.163 
continues to haunt same-sex stepparents. The Marriage Equality 
Act has enabled numerous same-sex partners to become 
stepparents. Despite this advancement, stepparents have no 
independent grounds to seek visitation with their stepchildren.164 In 
Bank v. White, the Appellate Division held that a stepfather 
                                                            
159 See Bank v. White, 837 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (2d Dep’t 2007); Spenser v. 
Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) (“[S]tepparents have no 
independent rights in relation to their step-children, they do derive certain legal 
and de facto rights and obligations as the spouse of a parent.”). 
160 See Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 566; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 
(McKinney 2014) (requiring support when the child at issue is a recipient of 
public assistance). 
161 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Daniel P. v. Robert B., 500 N.Y.S.2d 620, 
621 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986).  
162 See Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013). 
163 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). 
164 See Bank, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 182; Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 565–66 
(“[S]tepparents have no independent rights in relation to their step-children, they 
do derive certain legal and de facto rights and obligations as the spouse of a 
parent.”). 
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“lacked standing to seek visitation with his wife’s children.”165 The 
stepfather had lived with his wife and her two biological children 
from a previous marriage for six years.166  Despite the amount of 
time the plaintiff-stepfather spent with the children and acted as a 
“father figure,” the court rejected that a stepparent is a “parent” 
who can petition for visitation.167   
These stepparents cannot rely on the loophole created by 
Estrellita A. that allows same-sex parents to gain visitation if the 
biological parent sought a child-support order. Stepparents, on the 
other hand—from both same-sex and opposite sex partnerships—
rarely have legal obligations to pay child support, their only route 
to gain visitation.168 Under the New York Family Act § 415, there 
are limited circumstances wherein a stepparent becomes liable for 
child support.169 Even in these limited circumstances, the decision 
to hold a stepparent liable for child support is within the discretion 
of the court.170 Moreover, that obligation—if the court chooses to 
impose it—will end automatically upon divorce.171 Therefore, even 
if a stepparent fits into one of the limited categories that create an 
obligation to pay child support, this would not enable her to obtain 
visitation under the Estrellita A. rationale because there would be 
no obligation to pay child support following the divorce, which is 
when visitation would be sought.172 New York must develop a 
solution that benefits same-sex stepparents.  
                                                            
165 See Bank, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 182. 
166 Id. at 181–82.  
167 Id. (citing Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657). 
168 See Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 566. 
169 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 2014) (“[T]he spouse or parent 
of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need 
thereof or of a patient in an institution in the department of mental hygiene, if of 
sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person or patient, 
provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of his child or 
children who have not attained the age of twenty-one years. . . . Step-parents 
shall in like manner be responsible for the support of children under the age of 
twenty-one years.”). 
170 See Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Daniel P. v. Robert B., 500 N.Y.S.2d 
670 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986). 
171 Id. 
172 Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013). 
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IV.      THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES ARE AN INADEQUATE 
REMEDY 
 
There have been two proposed remedies for same-sex 
stepparents, who want to maintain a relationship with their non-
biological child: adoption173 and a stepparent visitation statute.174  
While these solutions offer clear standards that may reduce 
litigation in family court, they create undesirable barriers175 to 
same-sex stepparents, and they unnecessarily formalize the law by 
focusing on categorization rather than the relationship between the 
person seeking visitation and the child. 
 
A.  Adoption  
 
The New York Court of Appeals relies on the possibility of 
adoption to allow non-biological parents to seek visitation.176 The 
New York Legislature permitted stepparents to adopt the biological 
children of their spouses.177 If a spouse adopts a child, he or she 
obtains all of the same rights and obligations as a biological 
parent.178 There are two different types of adoption that will be 
discussed: traditional adoption and second-parent adoption.   
 
 
                                                            
173 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 190  (N.Y. 2010) (“We 
stressed that permitting second parent adoptions allows children to achieve a 
measure of permanency with both parent figures and avoids the sort of 
disruptive visitation battle we faced in Alison D.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
174 Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties 
to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 7 (2013) (stating 
that eight states—California, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin—have statutory provisions that permit 
stepparent visitation). 
175 Adoption generally requires the consent of both parents.  Limited 
statutory exceptions to this requirement are discussed infra at note 188.  
176 See Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190.  
177 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 2014).  
178 Id; see also In re Adoption of Jennifer, 538 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1989). 
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i. Traditional Adoption 
 
Traditionally, an order of adoption terminates the rights of the 
biological parents.179 Termination of parental rights by adoption 
most frequently occurs where a parent or couple gives the child up 
and a biological stranger adopts the child and acts as the primary 
caregiver.180 A literal reading of New York Domestic Relations 
Law § 117 suggests that a stepparent or partner could not adopt a 
child without terminating the rights of the noncustodial, biological 
parent.181 However, New York courts have modified this type of 
adoption.182 The Court of Appeals recognized this injustice and 
ruled that the adoption of a child by a stepparent does not terminate 
the rights of the noncustodial, biological parent.183  
Despite this ruling, adoption is not always easily attainable 
because it requires the consent of the other biological parent.184 As 
a matter of United States constitutional law, the rights of the 
biological parent are considered superior to those of all others.185 
                                                            
179 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 2014) (“After the 
making of an order of adoption the birth parents of the adoptive child shall 
terminate all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have 
no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession . . . 
.”). 
180 See e.g., In re Adoption by Emanuel T., 365 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1975). 
181 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §117(a). 
182 See, e.g., Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401–02 (N.Y. 1995) 
(holding that the portion of the statute that terminates the biological parent’s 
rights did not apply where the biological parent agrees to retain his or her rights 
and agrees to raise the child with the adoptive parent). 
183 Id. (“Given . . . the anomaly created by an unnecessarily literal reading 
of the statute, we conclude that neither subdivision (1)(a) nor subdivision (1)(i) 
was intended to have universal application.”).  
184 See In re of Estate of Seaman, 78 N.Y.2d 451, n.2 (1991) (stating that 
a stepparent may “adopt [a] child with the consent of, or after the death of, the 
noncustodial parent.”); Child Welfare Information Gateway, Consent to 
Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU 
(2013), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/ 
statutes/consent.pdf#Page=8&view=Fit. 
185 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (holding that a statute 
that permits “[a]ny person to petition a superior court for visitation rights 
whenever visitation may serve the best interest of the 
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New York family law jurisprudence has long recognized this 
superior right as well.186 Therefore, if the noncustodial parent 
objects to the adoption, the adoption does not go forward.187 Only 
in limited circumstances may a stepparent adopt a child without the 
consent of the biological parent.188 Divorce and other family law 
issues are often highly tumultuous; amidst the tumult, disgruntled 
noncustodial parents often deny adoption rights.189 Despite the 
availability of adoption, only about five percent of stepchildren are 
adopted by their stepparents,190 a figure that suggests adoption has 
been an ineffective tool to provide relief to same-sex stepparents 
looking to maintain a permanent role in their children’s lives. 
 
ii.  Second-Parent Adoption 
 
As with efforts to use traditional adoption as a remedy for 
limited visitation rights, efforts to use second-parent adoption as a 
                                                            
child . . . unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to 
rear their children.”).  
186 See, e.g., Matter of Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 127 (N.Y. 1992) (“A 
biological parent has a right to care and custody of a child, superior to that of 
other . . . .”). 
187 TIMOTHY PATRICK JOHNSON, EDITOR, THE MORALITY OF ADOPTION: 
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 247 (2005).  
188 See NY DOM. REL. LAW § 111(2)(a)–(e) (McKinney 2008). The statute 
provides five limited circumstances that permit adoption without consent. First, 
where the parent “evinces an intent to forego his or her parental custodial rights 
and obligations as manifested by his or her failure for a period of six months to 
visit the child and communicate with the child or person having legal custody of 
the child, although able to so.” Id. § (2)(a). Second, where the parent 
“surrendered the child to an authorized agency . . . .” Id § (2)(b). Third, where a 
“guardian has been appointed. Id. § (2)(c). Fourth, when “by reason of mental 
illness or mental retardation . . . [the parent] is presently and for the foreseeable 
future unable to provide proper care for the child.” Id § (2)(d). Lastly, when the 
parent has denied paternity. Id. § (2)(e).  
189 See Walter Wadlington, The Divorced Parent and Consent for 
Adoption, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 196, 207 (1967) (“At the same time, the out-of-
custody parent whose consent is required for adoption may stoop to the tactic of 
using his veto power to accomplish changes in a settlement agreement or to 
apply pressure in some other matter of concern between the ex-spouses.”).  
190 See Susan D. Stewart, Characteristics and Well-Being of Adopted 
Stepchildren, 59 FAM. REL. 558, 563 (2010). 
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remedy have similarly fallen short.191  Second-parent adoption 
allows an unmarried partner of a biological parent to adopt the 
child.192 Professor Julie Shapiro articulates two concerns 
surrounding second-parent adoption, “[f]irst, . . . [second-parent 
adoptions] divide our community. Second, . . . the uncritical 
acceptance of second-parent adoptions contributes to [LGBT 
partners’] domestication.”193 Shapiro’s first critique stems from the 
preferential treatment certain partners, who conform to 
heterosexual norms, receive under the law.194 This division 
delegitimizes certain parenting roles based on a legal classification, 
unrelated to the caregiving that person provides.195 Furthermore, 
second-parent adoptions perpetuate a distinction between “good 
lesbians” and “bad lesbians.”196 Second-parent adoptions are not 
available to all people, “[t]hey are not available to low-income 
lesbians or other lesbians practically excluded for any number of 
personal characteristics, including a history of drug or alcohol 
abuse, a criminal record, or an unconventional lifestyle.”197 
Therefore, someone who either cannot afford adoption or is 
discriminated against due to their past is unable to adopt. Only 
those who are perceived as good lesbians are permitted to adopt. 
Professor Shapiro’s second critique touches upon three 
different mechanisms by which second-parent adoption 
domesticates same-sex partners. The first critique is that “second-
parent adoptions provide a powerful incentive to mold oneself to 
fit the ‘good lesbian’ model, because courts typically approve 
                                                            
191 Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second Parent 
Adoptions, 14 BERKLEY WOMEN’S L.J. 17, 18 (1999).  
192 See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 110 (McKinney 2010). 
193 Shapiro, supra note 191, at 30.  
194 Id. “In serving the needs of some but not all non-legal mothers, 
second-parent adoptions reinforce the idea that there are two distinct categories 
of lesbians raising children: ‘real’ lesbian mothers, who may be able to adopt if 
they are fortunate, and those other lesbians, whose status as women raising 
children is diminished.” Id. The Article references “lesbians,” however, the 
principles and idea apply equally to men. 
195 Id. at 30–31, & n.75.  
196 Id. at 31. 
197 Id. 
286 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
second-parent adoptions for ‘good lesbians.’”198 The second 
critique is that “the legal possibility of second-parent adoptions 
may domesticate lesbians by convincing us to internalize the 
mainstream notion that a ‘real’ mother must be a legal one.”199 The 
last critique is that “second-parent adoptions . . . foster the belief 
that the law will protect rather than constrain lesbians.”200 Because 
of the practical and cultural problems associated with adoption, it 
is not an adequate remedy for same-sex partners.   
 
B.  A Stepparent Visitation Statute 
 
Another approach that some states have taken is to enact a 
visitation statute that specifically provides rights for stepparents.201 
The rationale for these statutes, as expressed by the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, is that “[a] stepparent may be as devoted and 
concerned about the welfare of a stepchild as a natural parent 
would be . . . . The departure of a stepparent from the home would 
no more destroy the love and affection between the stepparent and 
child than it would in the case of a natural child.”202 
However, a stepparent visitation statute is both over- and 
under-inclusive. This type of statute is over-inclusive because not 
all stepparents take an active role in childcare. Any person who 
marries a biological parent becomes a stepparent regardless of the 
nature of the relationship to the child. A stepparent visitation 
statute is also under-inclusive because it does not encompass 
individuals who have acted as a parent, but are not legally married 
to the biological parent. The law should look to the functional 
                                                            
198 Id. at 35.  
199 Id. at 36.  
200 Id. 
201 Atkinson, supra note 173, at 7 (stating that eight states, California, 
Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin, 
have statutory provisions that permit stepparent visitation).  For example, the 
New Hampshire statute states: “If the court determines that it is in the best 
interest of the children, it shall in its decree grant reasonable visitation privileges 
to a party who is a stepparent of the children . . . .” N.H. REV. STAT. § 461-
A:6(V). 
202 Atkinson, supra note 174, at 7–8 (quoting Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 
879, 881–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)). 
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relationship between the adult and child to determine whether 
visitation is necessary, not formalist categories that both leave 
merited parents out and bring undeserving parents in.  
Furthermore, stepparent visitation statutes do not remedy the 
“good lesbian” versus “bad lesbian” distinction that the current 
adoption framework creates.203 The law creates a second class of 
parental figures when it only recognizes a parental relationship 
through marriage. Some same-sex couples choose not to marry 
regardless of whether same-sex marriage is legal in a particular 
state.204 An individual who chooses not to marry should not be 
punished and denied a relationship with a child whom she 
substantially raised.   
Both solutions, adoption and a stepparent visitation statute, are 
inadequate to address the problem of same-sex stepparent 
visitation. Families need a solution that examines the relationship 
between the child and non-biological parent to determine whether 
visitation is beneficial to the child. De facto parenting would 
provide such a solution. 
 
V.  SOLUTION: A DE FACTO PARENTING STATUTE 
 
A de facto parent is “one who has no biological relation to the 
child, but has participated in the child’s life as a member of the 
child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the child and . . . 
performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the 
legal parent.”205 The de facto parent assumes a nurturing role 
                                                            
203 See Shapiro, supra note 191, at 31. 
204 See Cara Buckley, Gay Couples, Choosing to Say ‘I Don’t’, N.Y. 
TIMES (October 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/ 27/style/gay-
couples-choosing-to-say-i-dont.html?_r=0. Buckley recognizes that couples 
choose not to marry for various reasons,  
For some, marriage is an outdated institution, one that forces 
same-sex couples into the mainstream. For others, marriage 
imposes financial burdens and legal entanglements. Still 
others see marriage not as a fairy tale but as a potentially 
painful chapter that ends in divorce. And then there are those 
for whom marriage goes against their beliefs, religious or 
otherwise.” 
Id.  
205 Duncan, supra note 34, at 265 (2010) (quoting E.N.O v. L.M.M, 711 
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comparable to a legal parent and “shapes the child’s daily routine, 
addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides 
for his education and medical care and serves as a moral guide.” 206 
This Part proposes that New York should adopt a de facto 
parenting statute and will provide and analyze examples of de facto 
parenting statutes. These examples demonstrate the two different 
approaches to de facto parenting statutes that have been enacted: 
the expansive approach and the limited approach.207 The proposed 
New York statute should follow the limited approach.   
 
A.   New York Should Adopt a De Facto Parenting Statute 
 
The best solution for same-sex stepparents seeking visitation 
rights in New York is for the legislature to adopt a de facto 
parenting statute modeled after grandparent and sibling visitation 
statutes already in existence. De facto parenting removes the 
formalistic barriers to parental rights and instead considers whether 
that person has functioned as a parent in such a way that the denial 
of visitation would be contrary to the child’s best interest. The 
passage of a de facto parenting statute will grant individuals 
standing that would otherwise be barred under Alison D.208 
Courts should adopt the American Law Institute’s (ALI) three-
prong test for determining whether an individual qualifies as a de 
facto parent. The prongs are “residency,” “caretaking,” and 
“agreement.”209 “Residency” is when “a legal parent’s partner lives 
                                                            
N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999)).  
206 Id. 
207 See De Facto Parent Recognition Map, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/other_ 
parenting_laws (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
208 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding 
that the term “parent” is limited to biological parents in visitation disputes, and 
therefore the party did not have standing to seek visitation with the child).  
Because Alison D. interprets § 70 of N.Y. Domestic Relations Law, the addition 
of a de facto parenting statute would not technically overturn the case’s holding.  
But such a statute would render the application of Alison D.  meaningless where 
a parent is arguing that he or she is a “parent” within the meaning of § 70, but is 
instead a de facto parent under a different law.  
209 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting the Prerogatives of the Legal 
Parents: Judicial Skepticism of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De 
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with the child and the legal parent for . . . two years.”210 The 
“caretaking” prong “requires the partner to perform at least half of 
the caretaking functions for the child.”211 “Agreement” is met 
when the “child’s legal parent agrees to allow the partner to 
perform an equal share of the child’s caretaking.”212  Courts 
analyze “agreement” based on the couple’s relationship while they 
were still together, and not at the time of litigation, when a legal 
parent will predictably challenge the standing of her former partner 
by denying her status as a parent.213   
A central critique of the ALI test is that “the [three prongs] do 
not look for a bonded, dependent relationship of a parental nature 
between the child and the de facto parent in deciding which 
relationships to preserve. Instead the [prongs] opt . . . for an easily 
administrable test . . . .”214 For this reason, Professor Robin 
Fretwell Wilson finds that judges are reluctant to implement the 
ALI test.215 Arguably, there is some determination of the bond 
between the de facto parent and the child inherent in the caretaking 
prong. If, for example, an individual plays with a child, feeds a 
child, protects the child, and arranges for that child’s education, 
there is likely to be some basis of a bond between that person and 
the child. However, under the proposed de facto parenting statute, 
the ALI test would be used merely to define a de facto parent, 
similar to how a grandparent is defined as the parent of the child’s 
parent.216 Once the test determined that a person is in fact a de 
facto parent, she would still be required to demonstrate 
                                                            
Facto Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 477, 486 (2013).   
210 See id.   
211 Id. The ALI includes a list of various activities that qualify as 
caretaking, including “grooming,” “toilet training,” “playing with child,” 
“satisfying nutrition needs,” “discipline,” “arranging for education,” “providing 
moral guidance.” See id. at 489, fig. 1.  
212 Id. at 486.   
213 See Estrellita A v. Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013). 
214 Wilson, supra note 209, at 511.  
215 Id. at 507 (“the greatest bulk of de facto parent cases citing the 
Principles dispatch the claim by a live-in partner or other adult on a different 
basis than the ALI-test . . . .”). 
216 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2014). 
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extraordinary circumstances,217 which would necessarily look at 
the bond between the individual and the child. “Extraordinary 
circumstances” is a term of art in family law that has been used to 
determine whether visitation with a non-biological parent is 
warranted.218  Extraordinary circumstances must be proven before 
the court will make a determination about the best interest of the 
child.219  
The critiques of the ALI test are not applicable to the proposed 
de facto parenting statute. The ALI test allows courts to recognize 
individuals who have had sufficient involvement in a child’s life to 
warrant visitation after the termination of the relationship between 
the biological parent and partner. Since the person seeking 
visitation would still have the burden of demonstrating 
extraordinary circumstances, courts would continue considering 
the relationship between the child and the de facto parent and 
whether the revocation of that relationship would be detrimental to 
the child.   
 
B.   Examples of De Facto Parenting Statutes that Have Been 
Enacted in Other States 
 
New York would not be the first state to adopt a de facto 
                                                            
217 “Extraordinary circumstances” is a highly fact-sensitive inquiry 
conducted by courts to determine whether there are sufficient reasons to grant 
visitation to either a grandparent or sibling.  See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 725 
N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the requirement of extraordinary 
circumstances had been satisfied when the grandmother had been an 
exceptionally devoted grandmother by providing “financial, emotional, and 
physical support  . . .  visit[ing] with the child extensively, often keeping her for 
weekends, and car[ing] for [the child] for a more extended period when [the 
mother] suffered postpartum depression.”). A showing of extraordinary 
circumstances will also allow a court to award custody to a nonparent over a 
parent. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976). The 
burden for showing extraordinary circumstances in the context of visitation is 
less onerous than in custody cases, where an individual may be required to show 
“surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like 
extraordinary circumstances” to overcome the presumption in favor of parents. 
Id.   
218 See Bennett, 356 N.E.2d at 277. 
219 See Davis, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 815. 
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parenting regime.220 There have been two approaches to the 
adoption of de facto parenting: one approach grants a de facto 
parent all of the rights of a biological parent; the other adopts a 
more limited approach that does not equate the rights of a de facto 
parent with a biological parent.221 
Delaware is one of two states that have adopted the first 
approach, which grants a de facto parent all the rights of a 
biological parent.222 The determination that a person is a de facto 
parent creates either a mother-child or father-child relationship.223 
Delaware defines a de facto parent as someone who: 
(1) [h]as . . . the support and consent of the child’s 
parent or parents who fostered the formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship[;] . . . (2) 
[h]as exercised parental responsibility for the 
child[;] . . . and (3) [h]as acted in a parental role for 
a length of time sufficient to have established a 
bonded and dependent relationship with the child 
that is parental in nature.224 
The proposed statute for New York should not be as expansive as 
the Delaware model of de facto parenting. In New York,   unlike in 
Delaware, a de facto parent should not have the same rights as a 
biological parent.225 
                                                            
220 See De Facto Parent Recognition Map, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/other_parenting_laws (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). While only three states, New Mexico, Kansas, and 
Delaware, completely recognize de facto parents, twenty-two other states, 
including Pennsylvania, Maine, South Carolina, Texas, California, Nevada, 
Oregon, and Washington, recognize a limited version of de facto parenting. Id. 
221 Id.  
222 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2014).   
223 See id. § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6). 
224 See id. § 8-201(c).  Section 1101 of the statute defines “parental 
responsibilities” as “care, support and control of the child in a matter that 
provides for the child’s necessary physical needs, including adequate food, 
clothing and shelter, and that also provides for the mental and emotional health 
and development of such child.” Id. § 1101. 
225 This is due to the constitutional issues raised by the Delaware statute.  
For further discussion of the constitutionality of de facto parenting see infra Part 
IV(A).  
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California is the second state that recognizes de facto 
parenting, and it exemplifies the limited approach to de facto 
parenting. The proposed statute for New York should more closely 
resemble the limited approach to de facto parenting, such as that in 
California.226 Under California law, de facto parents are entitled to 
more rights than other third parties, but their rights do not rise to 
the level of those of biological parents.227 While California lacks a 
specific statute authorizing visitation to de facto parents, California 
case law has held that de facto parents may be entitled to 
visitation.228 
 
VI. CRITIQUES OF DE FACTO PARENTING 
 
The legal community has voiced criticism of de facto      
parenting models.229 The two most prominent critiques of de   facto   
parenting are: 1) it infringes on the rights of biological parents;230 
and 2) it is detrimental to the child.231 
 
 
                                                            
226 See, e.g., In re B.F., 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 561, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(demonstrating the limited nature of de facto parenting in California by holding 
that a de facto parent is not entitled to access a biological mother’s 
psychological evaluation).   
227 See CAL. CT. R. 5.534(e) (2014) (“On a sufficient showing, the court 
may recognize the child’s present or previous custodian as a de facto parent and 
grant him or her standing to participate as parties in the disposition hearing and 
any hearing thereafter at which the status of the dependent child is at issue.”).  
California defines a “de facto parent” as “a person who has been found by the 
court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both 
the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has 
assumed that role for a substantial period.” Id. R. 5.502(10). 
228 See In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
229 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 34, at 271; Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Too 
Many Cooks in the Kitchen?: The Potential Concerns of Finding More Parents 
and Fewer Legal Strangers in California’s Recently-Proposed Multiple-Parents 
Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023, 2027 (2013); Wilson, supra note 209, at 
505.   
230 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that an 
overly permissive visitation statute violated a parent’s constitutional interests). 
231 See Duncan, supra note 34, at 271; Pfenson, supra note 229, at 2059. 
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A.  The First Critique: De Facto Parenting Infringes upon the 
Constitutional Rights of the Biological Parents to Care for 
Their Children. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that granting standing for 
visitation to a non-parent infringes upon a parent’s constitutional 
rights.232 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have a 
fundamental interest in the “care, custody, and control of their 
children . . . .”233 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court invalidated a 
Washington statute that granted visitation to “any person . . . at any 
time . . . whenever visitation may serve the best interest of the 
child.”234 The court found that the statute infringed on the parents’ 
liberty interest.235 The Court reasoned that a parent and a non-
parent cannot be given equal treatment in custody and visitation 
cases.236  
To avoid constitutional infirmity, New York should adopt a 
limited de facto parenting statute. Courts have not interpreted 
Troxel to invalidate all expansions to standing in visitation 
cases.237 The Appellate Division of New York determined that 
Domestic Relations Law § 72, which established standing for 
grandparents who seek visitation with their grandchildren, was 
                                                            
232 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at  62–73. 
233 Id. at 65. “[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children 
. . . there will normally be no reason for the state to inject itself into the private 
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Id. at 68–69.  
234 Id. at 60. 
235 Id. at 68–73.  
236 Id. at 69 (“The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court 
intervened, but that it gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination 
of her child’s best interest . . . The judge’s comments suggest that he presumed 
the grandparents’ request should be granted unless the children would be 
‘impact[ed] adversely.’  In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial 
parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of 
her daughters.”). 
237 See Morgan v. Grzesik, 732 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (holding that the decision in Troxel does not invalidate N.Y. Dom Rel. 
Law § 72, which grants standing to grandparents to seek visitation upon a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances). 
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consistent with Troxel.238 The court gave two reasons why the 
statute was constitutional, in light of Troxel: first, the statute 
pertained to a very narrow set of people, grandparents; and second, 
standing was not automatic but was granted if “[the grandparents] 
can establish circumstances in which equity would see it fit to 
intervene.”239 These same limiting factors would be applicable to 
de facto parenting, and thus would not violate a biological parent’s 
constitutional interests. De facto parenting would only be available 
to individuals who meet the ALI factors of residence, caretaking, 
and agreement.240 Moreover, a de facto parent would be required to 
demonstrate the same “extraordinary circumstances” standard 
required for grandparents and siblings to receive visitation.241 Due 
to the limiting requirements of the three-prong test, de facto 
parenting would not infringe on biological parents’ interest in the 
care, custody, or control of their children.242   
The constitutional rights of biological parents are at greater risk 
under Delaware’s approach to de facto parenting, which equates a 
de facto parent to a biological parent. The constitutionality of 
Delaware’s statute has been challenged in court.243 In Bancroft v. 
Jameson, a mother’s boyfriend sought joint custody with the 
child’s mother and father under the de facto parenting statute.244 
The Delaware Family Court ruled that the statute 
unconstitutionally violated the parents’ liberty interests under 
Troxel.245 The court reasoned that Delaware courts have always 
recognized “the sacred constitutional rights of two parents to raise 
                                                            
238 See id. at 774–77. 
239 Id. at 776 (citing Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 
1991)). 
240 See Wilson, supra note 209, at 487.   
241 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 2014) (extending standing 
to siblings upon a showing a extraordinary circumstances); Id. § 72 (granting 
standing for visitation to grandparents upon a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances).  
242 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60, 65, 75 (2000) 
(deciding that the statute was unconstitutional in that it infringed on the 
biological parents’ fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, 
custody, and control of their children).  
243 Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2009). 
244 Id. at 732. 
245 See id. at 750 (relying on Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60). 
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children, with that right only being forfeited . . . when a child is 
found dependent or neglected in a parent’s care.”246 Because the 
statute required no showing of neglect or inadequate care on the 
part of the parents, the court held that the statute was overbroad.247 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently rejected 
the Family Court’s interpretation of the statute.248 In Smith v. 
Guest, an adoptive mother’s former lesbian partner filed a petition 
for custody, claiming that she was the child’s de facto parent.249 
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the statute was 
constitutional.250 In reaching this conclusion, the court held: 
Troxel does not control these facts. The issue here is 
not whether the Family Court has infringed Smith’s 
fundamental parental right to control who has 
access to [the child] (ANS) by awarding Guest co-
equal parental status.  Rather, the issue is whether 
Guest is a legal “parent” of ANS who would also 
have parental rights to ANS—rights that are co-
equal to Smith’s.251 
Delaware has now potentially jeopardized the constitutional 
rights of biological parents. For that reason, this Note argues for a 
more limited de facto parenting statute, which respects the rights of 
biological parents.252  
 
B.   The Second Critique: Visitation is Detrimental to the Child  
 
Critics who suggest that de facto parenting would be 
detrimental to the child proffer three grounds for their argument. 
First, stepparents or partners are likely to harm children.253 Second, 
“over-access” to children would be detrimental to the child.254 
                                                            
246 See id. at 749. 
247 See id. at 749–50. 
248 See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011). 
249 Id. at 924. 
250 Id. at 931. 
251 Id. 
252 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2014).   
253 See Stephen A. Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 537, 538 (2004).  
254 See Duncan, supra note 34, at 267.  Over-access occurs when more 
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Third, de facto parenting harms the institution of marriage, which 
in turn harms the children.255   
 
1.   A Legal Parent’s Significant Other is Likely to Abuse the 
Child 
 
One argument against de facto parenting is that spouses of 
biological parents are more likely to abuse children. Professor 
Wilson discussed the risks associated with de facto parenting.256 
The de facto parenting statute would primarily benefit biological 
parents’ significant others. Professor Wilson presents findings that 
suggest these significant others are more likely to abuse children, 
and therefore argues that de facto parenting should be avoided.257  
While Professor Wilson’s findings warrant concern for the 
safety of children, those statistics do not demonstrate the full 
picture of abuse and neglect cases.258  The Children’s Bureau of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found that the 
                                                            
than two people have a legal right to either custody or visitation. Critics perceive 
over-access as detrimental because it creates too much inconsistency in the 
child’s life. Id. 
255 Mary Summa, It Doesn’t Take a Village: The Destructive Effects of the 
De Facto Parenting Doctrine, FAM.  N.C., Spring 2013, at 8–9, available at 
http://ncfpc.org/FNC/1305-FNC-Spring13-8.2smallweb2.pdf.   
256 See Wilson, supra note 209, at 489 (“The ALI’s test fails to consider 
the risks to children that flow from significantly enlarging the parental rights of 
former male live-in partners.  Children who spend time with unrelated males 
outside the presence of their mothers are placed at a significantly higher risk of 
physical and sexual abuse.”).    
257 See id. at 490.  For example, Professor Wilson cites a study which state 
that “66.5% of the victims of sexual abuse came from families that experienced 
at least one change of parents before the age of 15, compared to 33% of children 
who did not experience abuse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
article further states that “60% of children who experienced intercourse as part 
of the abuse experience had been exposed to parental divorce or separation.” Id.  
Wilson cites a study by Rebecca Bolen that found that “children living with 
males in the household after separation of the parents were more than seven 
times more likely to be abused than children living with only females after 
separation.” Id. 
258 See CHILD WELFARE INFOR. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2012: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 3 (2014), 
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/canstats.pdf. 
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majority of abusers were legal parents, not live-in partners or 
spouses.259 Moreover, according to the Bureau’s findings, relatives 
(including grandparents and siblings) are more likely to abuse a 
child than the partner of a parent.260 However, relatives are 
routinely afforded standing to seek visitation.261 Live-in partners or 
stepparents’ rights should not be restricted based on statistics when 
even more troubling statistics do not prevent other groups from 
obtaining standing to seek visitation.  
In addition to these statistics, there are multiple stages in the 
judicial determination of de facto parenting where the potential for 
abuse would likely be revealed, and could act as a barrier to 
visitation. First, the requirement of extraordinary circumstances 
could be used to protect children from dangerous individuals. The 
burden of proof to establish extraordinary circumstances is on the 
party seeking visitation.262 Furthermore, if the individual satisfied 
the requirement of extraordinary circumstances, the court is 
required to further consider abuse when making a determination of 
what is in the child’s best interest.263 Thus the normal process of 
visitation litigation presents several opportunities for the detection 
and consideration of abuse. 
Secondly, Professor Stephen A. Newman has also argued 
against the use of social science as an argument against 
visitation.264 He points out that social science statistics were 
manipulated to support injustices in the contexts of interracial 
marriage, eugenics, and same-sex marriage.265 This misuse has 
                                                            
259 See id.  (“More than 80 percent (80.8 percent) of perpetrators of child 
maltreatment were parents, 5.9 percent were other relatives, and 4.2 percent 
were unmarried partners or parents.”).  
260 Id.  
261 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 71–72 (McKinney 2014).  
262 See Jamison v. Chase, 841 N.Y.S.2d 140, 140 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). 
263 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2014) (“If an allegation 
that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the 
court shall consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation 
arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall not place 
a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that 
child . . . .”). 
264 See Newman, supra note 253, at 538. 
265 See id. at 538–49. 
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warped judicial findings.266 For example, Justice Schenk in Perez 
v. Lippold relied on a study conducted in Jamaica that concluded 
that the “crossing of distinct races is biologically undesirable and 
should be discouraged.”267 This erroneous sociological finding 
enabled Justice Schenk to conclude that “intermarriage between 
Negroes and white persons [was] incompatible with the general 
welfare . . . .”268 
Similarly, some supposed experts have testified to the harmful 
effects of same-sex marriage on children.269 These experts have 
cautioned that same-sex marriage can lead to a plethora of 
problems for children including “economic poverty, conduct 
disorders, poor school performance, and teenage pregnancy.”270 
Professor Newman cautions against using social science to make 
broad generalizations.271 Instead, the court should make 
individualized, case-specific determinations about what is in the 
child’s best interest, an assessment consistent with the procedures 
of a de facto parenting regime.272   
Social science data are highly susceptible to manipulation and 
                                                            
266 See id. at 538–49. 
267 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 45 (Cal. 1948) (Schenk, J., dissenting) 
(citing B.C. DAVENPORT & MORRIS STEGGERDA, RACE CROSSING IN 
JAMAICA (1929)); see also Newman, supra note 252, at 539–40.   
268 Perez, 198 P.2d at 45 (Schenk, J., dissenting). 
269 Newman, supra note 253, at 545.   
270 Id.   
271 Id. at 551 (“Sweeping statements about any group, be it handicapped 
persons, interracial couples, or homosexuals, often reflect little more than 
prevailing social prejudice and intolerance.”).   
272 Id. at 552.  Professor Newman proposes four pillars to avoid falling 
prey to these generalizations:  
A. Avoid Stereotypes that Cast Doubt upon Whole Categories 
of People Acting in the Role of Parent. . . .  
B. Determine Children’s Best Interests by Considering the 
Many Factors, Tangible and Intangible, that Affect Their 
Well-Being. . . .   
C. Avoid Using an Idealized Family Arrangement as the Legal 
Standard for Judging Today’s Families . . . .  
D. Don’t Allow Community Prejudice to Dictate Decision-
making About Children’s Welfare. 
Id.  at 551–59.   
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can be unreliable. In the context of same-sex marriage, social 
science data can be a reflection of prejudice or the result of an 
idealized version of the heteronormative family.273 The answer to 
judges’ concerns regarding children’s welfare will not be found by 
looking to social science.274 Courts should take an individualized 
approach, rather than allowing over-generalized and potentially 
biased studies to determine what is in the child’s best interest. 
 
2.  Over-Access to Children  
 
Critics also cite over-access as a reason why de facto       
parenting will adversely affect children.275 This concern has been      
labeled the “Count Olaf Doctrine.”276 Proponents of this        
argument speculate that the number of individuals with legal  
access to children will grow too large.277 The fear is that de facto  
parenting will “introduce children to the anguish of being between 
three or four worlds.”278 Over-access induces negative effects for 
children because it “threatens the stability” and “undercuts the 
authority of a biological or adoptive parent . . . .”279 
The inclusion of extraordinary circumstances as a prerequisite 
to standing narrows the field of people who would qualify as a de 
facto parent under the proposal in this Note, thus minimizing the 
concerns of children being caught in “three or four worlds.” The 
                                                            
273 See id. at 556–59.  
274 See id. at 559 (“There is no conclusive, scientific answer to the 
question of what children’s development and well-being will be if society 
permits same-sex marriages.  This is not surprising, in view of the limited nature 
of research done, and the difficulties of doing large scale, randomized, 
controlled studies.  Indeed, virtually none of the changes that have dramatically 
affected the institution of marriage in recent times . . . have been preceded by 
reliable scientific studies demonstrating the likely effects of such changes on 
children.”).  
275 See Duncan, supra note 34, at 267. 
276 See id. The doctrine was named after the fictional character, Count 
Olaf, from Lemony Snicket’s book, The Bad Beginning, because the character 
relied on the doctrine of in loco parentis.  Id. at 267 n.25 (citing LEMONY 
SNICKET, THE BAD BEGINNING 66 (1999)).   
277 Id. at 267. 
278 Id. at 268. 
279 Id. at 269. 
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Count Olaf Doctrine incorrectly assumes that de facto parenting 
will allow any former spouse or partner to be granted visitation 
with the child.280 Such an assumption misconstrues the purpose of 
de facto parenting. The purpose is to allow individuals who have 
played a significant role in a child’s life to continue that 
relationship. The standard of extraordinary circumstances is not 
easy to achieve.281 Merely qualifying as a de facto parent would 
not guarantee an order of visitation any more than qualifying as a 
grandparent would. 
Critics also cite practical concerns related to over-access.282 
Scheduling visitation between two parents can be complicated 
enough, and adding an additional parent worsens that problem.283  
Critics argue this arrangement threatens the stability of children’s 
lives.284 However, these practical concerns should be allayed given 
the court’s obligation to consider visitation arrangements in the 
child’s best interest determination. If a parent can show that 
visitation would jeopardize stability for the child, then such a 
showing would weigh against an order of visitation. However, this 
factor should be relatively minor. In all likelihood, scheduling 
difficulties would pale in comparison to the grave risk of a child’s 
loss of access to a loved one. A case-by-case determination is 
                                                            
280 Id. at 266. (“Given the not infrequent incidence of serial divorce 
followed by remarriage (or divorce followed by serial cohabitation) the potential 
number of children who could be affected by the recognition of this new legal 
status is significant.”). 
281 See Colon v. Delgado, 963 N.Y.S.2d 663, 663–64 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013) (holding that a grandmother had established extraordinary circumstances 
because “the child lived with her mother and grandmother until her mother’s 
death and, thereafter, her grandmother assumed primary responsibility for her 
care . . . . This prolonged separation between the father and his daughter, and his 
lack of involvement in her life, warranted a finding of extraordinary 
circumstances.”).  
282 See Duncan, supra note 34, at 268; Summa, supra note 255, at 1–2. 
283 See Duncan, supra note 34, at 268 (“As difficult as it is for children to 
navigate between the expectations and demands of two households, a common 
enough occurrence in instances of divorce, imagine the difficulty of navigating 
the demands of a mother, her former partner, a sperm donor father and perhaps 
even his partner – or shuttling between the homes of a mother and father and the 
mother’s ex-husband or ex-boyfriend.”). 
284 Id. at 269. 
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necessary to find what is in the individual child’s best interest 
because no two families are alike. Over-generalized statements 
about what is in every child’s best interest—like over-
generalizations about how many people should be involved in a 
child’s upbringing—should be avoided. 
Furthermore, a biological parent would still have a superior 
access right, which should reduce concerns related to over-
access.285 A de facto parenting law would not change that 
foundational principle. Visitation orders can be flexible286 and the 
parenting time that the de facto parent receives doesn’t need to be 
equal to that of the biological parent(s). This flexibility lies in 
contrast to Delaware’s statute, which grants a de facto parent the 
same rights as biological parents and, therefore, creates a higher 
likelihood that more than two individuals will equally share 
parenting time.287  
In sum, the concern about over-access is inapposite to a limited 
approach to the de facto parent doctrine because the situational 
nature of the exceptional circumstances doctrine narrows the field 
of putative individuals seeking access/visitation, the flexibility of 
the doctrine permits consideration of practical and scheduling 
concerns, and the doctrine never divests the natural parent of his or 
her superior access right. 
 
3.   Diminishing the Value of Marriage 
 
Critics of de facto parenting also contend that allowing 
additional people to obtain the same parental rights inherent in 
marriage undercuts the importance of marriage, and ultimately 
creates a disincentive for people to marry.288 This critique misses 
the primary purpose of visitation: the best interest of the child. 
Even if de facto parenting decreased the value of marriage, such an 
effect is inconsequential compared to the happiness and well-being 
                                                            
285 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).   
286 Parents may stipulate agreements that set out visitation schedules; 
however, this agreement may be modified if the court find “fraud, duress, 
mistake, or overreaching.” See Conti v. Conti, 657 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977). 
287 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), (c) (2014).   
288 See Summa, supra note 255, at 9. 
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of the subject children.289 Additionally, the societal value of 
marriage may be declining anyway.290 Marriage rates in the United 
States are at a record low, and more couples are choosing to 
cohabitate and not marry.291  Even if de facto parenting contributes 
to the diminution of marriage, the value gained for children— who 
gain greater access to a loved one—outweighs that cost. The value 
of marriage should not be a factor in determining whether someone 
has standing to seek visitation.  The focus should be on the 
relationship between the individual and child. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In Alison D. v. Virginia M., the New York Court of Appeals 
altered the legal landscape for same-sex partners by limiting the 
term “parent” to biology.292 While subsequent cases carved out 
limited exceptions to this principle, through either child support or 
the doctrine of comity, Alison D. remains the law today.293 In an 
                                                            
289 In fact, numerous studies show that alternative families provide 
considerable benefits for children.  See, e.g.,  Michael E. Lamb, Mothers, 
Fathers, Families, and Circumstances: Factors Affecting Children’s 
Adjustment, 16 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 98, 104 (2012) (“[N]umerous 
studies of children and adolescents raised by same-sex parents conducted over 
the past 25 years by respected researchers and published in peer-reviewed 
academic journals conclude that they are as successful psychologically, 
emotionally, and socially as children and adolescents raised by heterosexual 
parents.”). 
290 See Trever Butterworth, What’s Behind The US Decline In Marriage? 
Pragmatism., FORBES (June 25, 2013, 3:34PM), http://www.forbes. 
com/sites/trevorbutterworth/2013/06/25/whats-behind-the-us-decline-in-
marriage-pragmatism/. 
291 Marriage Rate Declines to Historic Low, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON 
POST (7/22/2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/marriage-
rate_n_3625222.html. 
292 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 657 (N.Y. 1991).   
293 See Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576, 590 (N.Y. 2010) (granting 
visitation to a non-biological partner because the couple had been married in 
Canada, and under Canada law that made her a “parent”); Estrellita A. v. 
Jennifer D., 963 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2013) (holding that “respondent 
is judicially estopped from asserting that petitioner is not a parent based upon 
her sworn petition and testimony in a prior court proceeding where she took a 
different position because her interest in that case was different.”). 
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effort to maintain the holding of Alison D., the New York Court of 
Appeals has created inconsistent principles about who qualifies as 
a parent.294 These principles have failed to account for a significant 
number of same-sex partners and stepparents.  According to U.S. 
Census Data, eleven percent of same-sex families have children 
through either adoption or from a previous marriage.295 However, 
in New York, there is neither a right to visitation for stepparents 
nor an obligation to pay child support.296 Therefore, same-sex 
stepparents face substantial obstacles to visitation with their 
children. 
The solution to this problem is the recognition of de facto 
parenting. New York should adopt a de facto parenting visitation 
statute that is modeled after the grandparent and sibling visitation 
statutes already in effect.297 The American Law Institute provides 
useful guidelines for determining who qualifies as a de facto 
parent.298 In addition to meeting the requirements of a de facto 
parent, an individual would also be required to prove extraordinary 
circumstances.299 By requiring extraordinary circumstances as a 
                                                            
294 Beekman, supra note 23, at 227–28 (comparing the cases of Debra H. 
and H.M. which were decided on the same day, but represent different views of 
the scope of parenting in the context of custody/visitation cases and child 
support cases.). 
295 Krivickas, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.1.  
296 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (McKinney 2014) (“[T]he spouse or 
parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become 
in need thereof or of a patient in an institution in the department of mental 
hygiene, if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person or 
patient. . . . Stepparents shall in like manner be responsible for the support of 
children under the age of twenty-one years.”); Bank v. White,  837 N.Y.S.2d 
181, 182 (N.Y. App. Div.  2007); Spenser v. Spenser, 488 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) (“[S]tepparents have no independent rights in relation to 
their step-children, they do derive certain legal and de facto rights and obligation 
as the spouse of a parent.”). 
297 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 2014) (authorizing parents 
to petition for visitation with a child); id. § 71 (extending standing to siblings 
upon a showing a extraordinary circumstances); id. § 72 (granting standing for 
visitation to grandparents upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances).  
298 See Wilson, supra note 209, at 486 (stating that to qualify as a de facto 
parent, an individual must meet the requirements of residency, caretaking, and 
agreement).   
299 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72. 
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threshold showing, courts would ensure that only individuals who 
have developed a substantial relationship with a child are able to 
obtain visitation. By requiring such a showing, the biological or 
adoptive parent’s constitutional rights remain fully intact. Further, 
the flexibility of the approach allows for courts to consider whether 
the ex-same-sex partner seeking visitation poses a physical danger 
or a threat of over-burdening the child with involved parents. 
Rather than continuing to carve out limited exceptions, New York 
should adopt an approach that looks at the role an individual has 
had in a child’s life and makes a functional determination about 
whether that relationship warrants visitation. 
 
